



THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
RADIONAVIGATION LABORATORY



Robust and Secure Perception for Automated Vehicles

Todd Humphreys

Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, The University of Texas at Austin

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Grand challenge:


Design automated systems that are both *robust* in the face of unusual natural or accidental events and *secure* against deliberate attack

Robustness and Security at Odds



Improved robustness can reduce security: After the recent Tesla update to Autopilot 8.0, radar can force automatic braking without cross-validation from camera

Robustness and Security at Odds



Booker, "Mutual interference of mm-wave radar systems." (2007)

The security of automotive radar systems against deliberate attack is weak because the standard FMCW waveform is trivially predictable

Robustness and Security in Unison



Having many subsystems with non-overlapping failure modes improves both robustness and security

**Robust
&
Secure**

Robust
&
Secure

**Some form of precise GNSS will be required for
poor-weather lane keeping in areas with few
pre-mapped radar reflectors**



In low-visibility conditions, LIDAR and cameras will fail. If pre-mapped radar reflectors are too sparse, lane keeping may be compromised

SAE level	Name	Narrative Definition	Execution of Steering and Acceleration/Deceleration	Monitoring of Driving Environment	Fallback Performance of Dynamic Driving Task	System Capability (Driving Modes)
Human driver monitors the driving environment						
0	No Automation	the full-time performance by the <i>human driver</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> , even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems	Human driver	Human driver	Human driver	n/a
1	Driver Assistance	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> execution by a driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the <i>human driver</i> perform all remaining aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i>	Human driver and system	Human driver	Human driver	Some driving modes
2	Partial Automation	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> execution by one or more driver assistance systems of both steering and acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the <i>human driver</i> perform all remaining aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i>	System	Human driver	Human driver	Some driving modes
Automated driving system ("system") monitors the driving environment						
3	Conditional Automation	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> performance by an <i>automated driving system</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> with the expectation that the <i>human driver</i> will respond appropriately to a <i>request to intervene</i>	System	System	Human driver	Some driving modes
4	High Automation	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> performance by an <i>automated driving system</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> , even if a <i>human driver</i> does not respond appropriately to a <i>request to intervene</i>	System	System	System	Some driving modes
5	Full Automation	the full-time performance by an <i>automated driving system</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> under all roadway and environmental conditions that can be managed by a <i>human driver</i>	System	System	System	All driving modes

SAE level	Name	Narrative Definition	Execution of Steering and Acceleration/Deceleration	Monitoring of Driving Environment	Fallback Performance of Dynamic Driving Task	System Capability (Driving Modes)
Human driver monitors the driving environment						
0	No Automation	the full-time performance by the <i>human driver</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> , even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems	Human driver	Human driver	Human driver	n/a
1	Driver Assistance	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> execution by a driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the <i>human driver</i> perform all remaining aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i>	Human driver and system	Human driver	Human driver	Some driving modes
2	Partial Automation	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> execution by one or more driver assistance systems of both steering and acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the <i>human driver</i> perform all remaining aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i>	System	Human driver	Human driver	Some driving modes
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4	High Automation	the <i>driving mode-specific</i> performance by an <i>automated driving system</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> , even if a <i>human driver</i> does not respond appropriately to a <i>request to intervene</i>	System	System	System	Some driving modes
5	Full Automation	the full-time performance by an <i>automated driving system</i> of all aspects of the <i>dynamic driving task</i> under all roadway and environmental conditions that can be managed by a <i>human driver</i>	System	System	System	All driving modes

**We should be designing for Level 6:
Continued operation under conditions in which
a human couldn't manage**



WELCOME TO UT SAVES

SAVES (Situation-Aware Vehicular Engineering Systems) is a research center within UT's Wireless Networking and Communications Group (WNCG) that addresses the challenges of wireless, networking, and sensing in vehicular systems.

Current Affiliates:

Toyota, Honda, Qualcomm, AT&T, National Instruments, Fujitsu, Huawei


Q: What vehicle positioning techniques will suffice for urban areas?

Light urban setting




Urban setting







Goal: Lateral position accuracy better than 30cm @ 95%, under ***all outdoor conditions***. Satisfies integrity risk less than 10^{-6} for 12-ft lane width (highway)



Precise

Standard



Dec. 2014: First successful RTK solution with a smartphone antenna. But this was a rooftop test. What about down on the streets?


Legend
3D (clampToGround)
Feature 1

ublox M8T code-based solution


UT pprx code-based solution

UT pprx+ppengine CDGNSS solution






Q: How far can we push CDGNSS in urban areas?



GRID: General Radionavigation Interfusion Device													=====														
Receiver time:				0 weeks 600.9 seconds			Build ID: 3442			GPS time:				1965 weeks 244541.6 seconds													
CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR	C/N0	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status	CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR	C/N0	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status	CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR	C/N0	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status	
----- GPS L1 CA PRIMARY -----																											
1	2	-1343.8	782989.6	21128343.1	42.5	63.0	36.0	6c	1	2	-1343.7	750416.7	21128341.2	42.1	63.0	36.0	6c	1	2	-1343.7	750416.7	21128341.2	42.1	63.0	36.0	6c	
2	5	-1661.7	902836.6	19249040.5	48.3	36.0	64.5	6c	2	5	-1661.5	868181.1	19249037.8	47.8	36.0	64.5	6c	2	5	-1661.5	868181.1	19249037.8	47.8	36.0	64.5	6c	
3	12	-3373.4	1987585.1	21709900.9	43.0	196.3	27.7	6c	3	12	-3373.0	1904292.2	21709899.1	47.1	196.3	27.7	6c	3	12	-3373.0	1904292.2	21709899.1	47.1	196.3	27.7	6c	
4	20	1279.8	-865862.0	19194139.2	46.0	243.2	63.8	6c	4	13	2460.6	-1467508.2	21549241.3	40.6	131.4	29.8	6c	4	13	2460.6	-1467508.2	21549241.3	40.6	131.4	29.8	6c	
5	25	-2022.9	1118935.8	20918316.9	44.9	238.8	40.3	6c	5	15	3374.5	-1960402.4	22036083.3	44.3	170.5	23.4	6c	5	15	3374.5	-1960402.4	22036083.3	44.3	170.5	23.4	6c	
6	29	1979.6	-1258804.9	19582115.1	47.9	328.4	55.5	6c	6	20	1279.5	-824962.7	19194137.8	46.7	243.2	63.8	6c	6	20	1279.5	-824962.7	19194137.8	46.7	243.2	63.8	6c	
7	13	2460.6	-1467509.0	21549244.8	43.1	131.4	29.8	6c	7	21	1706.3	-991877.4	23621778.4	38.0	283.5	12.7	6c	7	21	1706.3	-991877.4	23621778.4	38.0	283.5	12.7	6c	
8	15	3374.3	-1960403.0	22036087.3	44.7	170.5	23.4	6c	8	25	-2022.4	1075087.8	20918315.1	44.2	238.8	40.3	6c	8	25	-2022.4	1075087.8	20918315.1	44.2	238.8	40.3	6c	
9	21	1705.6	-991877.2	23621779.0	40.1	283.5	12.7	6c	9	29	1979.6	-1202363.9	19582114.2	47.6	328.4	55.5	6c	9	29	1979.6	-1202363.9	19582114.2	47.6	328.4	55.5	6c	
10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
----- GPS L2 CLM PRIMARY -----																											
1	5	-1294.3	676504.0	19249033.4	45.8	36.0	64.5	5	1	5	-1294.9	676504.9	19249046.9	47.0	36.0	64.5	5	1	5	-1294.9	676504.9	19249046.9	47.0	36.0	64.5	5	
2	12	-2628.8	1483861.6	21709895.5	42.3	196.3	27.7	5	2	12	-2628.7	1483862.2	21709908.7	40.8	196.3	27.7	5	2	12	-2628.7	1483862.2	21709908.7	40.8	196.3	27.7	5	
3	15	2628.9	-1527582.2	22036083.3	41.6	170.5	23.4	5	3	15	2629.6	-1527582.8	22036097.8	39.3	170.5	23.4	5	3	15	2629.6	-1527582.8	22036097.8	39.3	170.5	23.4	5	
4	25	-1575.8	837730.5	20918313.7	44.1	238.8	40.3	5	4	25	-1575.8	837730.2	20918327.4	43.4	238.8	40.3	5	4	25	-1575.8	837730.2	20918327.4	43.4	238.8	40.3	5	
5	29	1542.8	-936906.6	19582109.2	43.9	328.4	55.5	5	5	29	1542.8	-936906.8	19582123.4	45.1	328.4	55.5	5	5	29	1542.8	-936906.8	19582123.4	45.1	328.4	55.5	5	
6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
----- SBAS L1 I PRIMARY -----																											
1	131	-48.3	18694.0	35836255.6	46.3	214.8	48.9	6	1	131	-48.2	16607.2	35836250.2	44.9	214.8	48.9	6	1	131	-48.2	16607.2	35836250.2	44.9	214.8	48.9	6	
2	135	-47.1	17814.2	36620656.2	45.3	234.5	38.0	6	2	133	-123.7	63883.1	35482512.3	43.0	180.5	54.5	6	2	133	-123.7	63883.1	35482512.3	43.0	180.5	54.5	6	
3	138	-51.2	20063.8	35565790.0	47.0	198.5	53.2	6	3	135	-47.2	17609.8	36620658.0	46.4	234.5	38.0	6	3	135	-47.2	17609.8	36620658.0	46.4	234.5	38.0	6	
4	133	-123.7	63286.4	35482515.8	43.6	180.5	54.5	6	4	138	-50.4	19992.2	35565787.8	47.0	198.5	53.2	6	4	138	-50.4	19992.2	35565787.8	47.0	198.5	53.2	6	
----- GALILEO E1 BC PRIMARY -----																											
1	2	-2263.8	1273668.6	25887705.4	43.5	243.4	16.0	6	1	2	-2263.8	1273668.1	25887704.4	41.5	243.4	16.0	6	1	2	-2263.8	1273668.1	25887704.4	41.5	243.4	16.0	6	
2	4	-2315.7	1278521.1	25606366.3	41.1	42.4	18.7	6	2	4	-2315.5	1278520.5	25606366.9	38.1	42.4	18.7	6	2	4	-2315.5	1278520.5	25606366.9	38.1	42.4	18.7	6	
3	5	2388.4	-1424573.5	23410321.5	47.1	182.2	43.4	6	3	5	2388.3	-1424573.5	23410318.5	45.6	182.2	43.4	6	3	5	2388.3	-1424573.5	23410318.5	45.6	182.2	43.4	6	
4	9	-85.4	-36855.5	20433681.7	46.6	86.8	61.4	6	4	9	-85.2	-36854.7	20433679.1	46.3	86.8	61.4	6	4	9	-85.2	-36854.7	20433679.1	46.3	86.8	61.4	6	
5	11	-1293.4	709001.1	23734748.1	35.7	91.9	33.8	6	5	11	-1292.7	709000.6	23734746.2	42.7	91.9	33.8	6	5	11	-1292.7	709000.6	23734746.2	42.7	91.9	33.8	6	
6	22	1853.0	-1067434.6	23014817.2	43.5	309.6	25.5	6	6	22	1853.0	-1067434.7	23014815.7	43.6	309.6	25.5	6	6	22	1853.0	-1067434.7	23014815.7	43.6	309.6	25.5	6	
7	30	-720.2	259884.0	24451915.2	38.2	293.9	11.1	6	7	30	-721.1	253501.6	24451916.3	31.3	293.9	11.1	6	7	30	-721.1	253501.6	24451916.3	31.3	293.9	11.1	6	
8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
----- Navigation Data -----																											
X:	-741194.13	Y:	-5462362.04	Z:	3197959.42	deltRx:	-1307489.33		Xvel:	0.01	Yvel:	0.05	Zvel:	0.03	deltRxDot:	9.12		Hsigma:	0.13	Vsigma:	0.24	NISratio:	0.58				

Legend
▲ sps



===== GRID: General Radionavigation Interfusion Device ======
Receiver time: 0 weeks 808.9 seconds Build ID: 3442

GPS time: 1965 weeks 244749.6 seconds

CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR (meters)	C/N0 (dB-Hz)	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status	CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR (meters)	C/N0 (dB-Hz)	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status
GPS_L1_CA_PRIMARY																	
1	2	-1411.8	1067034.9	21182394.7	38.7	64.6	35.1	6c	1	2	-1411.9	1034458.1	21182392.7	42.8	64.6	35.1	6c
2	5	-1797.7	1260713.4	19317141.4	47.5	35.7	62.9	6c	2	5	-1797.6	1226055.7	19317139.5	47.3	35.7	62.9	6c
3	12	-3367.3	2692235.3	21843992.4	45.1	195.6	26.3	6c	3	12	-3367.3	2608946.6	21843990.9	46.3	195.6	26.3	6c
4	20	1175.4	-1120164.0	19145747.6	45.8	246.0	65.1	6c	4	13	2400.6	-1972221.7	21453198.4	44.0	130.0	30.9	6c
5	25	-2099.7	1550124.1	21000369.4	45.2	237.1	39.2	6c	5	15	3381.4	-2660121.3	21902931.9	42.9	169.8	24.9	6c
6	29	1867.6	-1660452.7	19505684.8	48.4	328.6	57.1	6c	6	20	1175.4	-1079262.6	19145746.6	45.9	246.0	65.1	6c
7	13	2400.9	-1972222.9	21453201.3	44.3	130.0	30.9	6c	7	21	1689.3	-1344770.5	23554625.4	38.9	284.7	13.5	6c
8	15	3382.0	-2660123.9	21902933.8	43.0	169.8	24.9	6c	8	25	-2099.7	1506280.9	21000369.0	43.5	237.1	39.2	6c
9	21	1689.6	-1344771.3	23554629.3	36.3	284.7	13.5	6c	9	29	1867.4	-1604012.7	19505683.7	47.4	328.6	57.1	6c
10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-
11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-
12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-
GPS_L2_CLM_PRIMARY																	
1	5	-1400.5	955369.0	19317134.2	44.6	35.7	62.9	5	1	5	-1400.6	955368.1	19317148.6	46.2	35.7	62.9	5
2	12	-2623.4	2032937.6	21843989.2	40.9	195.6	26.3	5	2	12	-2623.6	2032942.5	21844002.6	39.3	195.6	26.3	5
3	15	2635.2	-2072818.9	21902929.4	42.5	169.8	24.9	5	3	15	2634.6	-2072817.1	21902943.1	36.8	169.8	24.9	5
4	25	-1636.7	1173721.9	21000366.0	43.6	237.1	39.2	5	4	25	-1635.5	1173724.5	21000381.7	42.1	237.1	39.2	5
5	29	1455.6	-1249878.9	19505677.4	44.3	328.6	57.1	5	5	29	1455.3	-1249879.9	19505692.2	45.5	328.6	57.1	5
6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-
7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-
SBAS_L1_I_PRIMARY																	
1	131	-31.1	29454.0	35838301.7	44.9	214.8	48.9	6	1	131	-31.5	27370.7	35838299.8	46.6	214.8	48.9	6
2	135	-29.5	28389.9	36622656.7	44.4	234.5	38.0	6	2	133	-111.6	90453.2	35487568.2	42.7	180.5	54.5	6
3	138	-35.7	31305.0	35567928.7	45.9	198.5	53.2	6	3	135	-30.8	28091.5	36622656.3	43.6	234.5	38.0	6
4	133	-111.7	89853.9	35487570.7	41.6	180.5	54.5	6	4	138	-35.3	31236.5	35567927.3	46.1	198.5	53.2	6
GALILEO_E1_BC_PRIMARY																	
1	2	-2264.4	22113.6	25977868.1	40.2	242.4	15.1	6	1	2u	-2263.0	-0.0	0.0	38.0	242.4	15.1	6
2	4	-2435.1	1768875.7	25699679.3	37.1	41.9	17.8	6	2	4	-2436.5	1768867.4	25699677.0	39.5	41.9	17.8	6
3	5	2353.4	-1915162.6	23316965.4	46.2	182.3	44.8	6	3	5	2353.3	-1915159.4	23316963.6	46.3	182.3	44.8	6
4	9	-210.3	-7189.5	20439326.8	45.4	83.9	61.4	6	4	9	-209.9	-7190.1	20439324.3	47.6	83.9	61.4	6
5	11	-1353.5	983158.7	23786918.0	40.6	93.3	33.2	6	5	11	-1354.9	983155.5	23786915.8	42.0	93.3	33.2	6
6	22	1823.6	-1451091.4	22941807.0	43.1	310.5	26.3	6	6	22u	1823.5	-0.0	0.0	42.9	310.5	26.3	6
7	30u	-841.4	-0.0	0.0	33.8	292.7	10.8	3*	7	30	-823.2	414142.6	24482483.6	35.3	292.7	10.8	6

--- Navigation Data




```
X: -741265.91  Y: -5462527.36  Z: 3197665.65  deltRx: -1305247.9  
Xvel: -3.79  Yvel: -4.74  Zvel: -8.84  deltRxDot: 12.6  
Hsigma: 0.14  Vsigma: 0.26  NISratio: 0.55
```

Legend
▲ sps



GRID: General Radionavigation Interfusion Device									
Receiver time:			0 weeks 1417.3 seconds		Build ID:		3442		
GPS time:			1965 weeks 245358.0 seconds						
CH	TXID	Doppler (Hz)	BCP (cycles)	PR (meters)	C/N0 (dB-Hz)	Az (deg)	El (deg)	Status	
GPS_L1_CA_PRIMARY									
1	2	-1502.5	1796.9	21349029.9	34.9	69.1	32.7	6c-	1
2	5	-2088.7	2432327.5	19540086.3	46.4	35.4	58.1	6	2
3	12	-3481.7	480469.0	22245894.1	38.0	193.7	22.1	6-	3
4	20	831.9	-1725295.4	19030594.6	45.2	255.8	68.5	6c	4
5	21	1638.5	-28325.3	23360131.6	31.7	288.2	16.0	6	5
6	29	1590.0	-2727910.6	19302554.1	48.2	328.8	61.9	6c	6
7	13	2154.0	-199744.1	21192915.7	42.6	125.6	34.2	6c-	7
8	15	3251.9	-984558.6	21524689.7	44.5	167.8	29.1	6c	8
9	25	-2394.9	43766.9	21263961.3	39.1	232.3	36.0	6c-	9
10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10
11	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11
12	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12
GPS_L2_CLM_PRIMARY									
1	5	-1627.5	1868306.2	19540079.4	43.7	35.4	58.1	5	1
2	12	-2699.6	1229747.1	22245890.1	35.3	193.7	22.1	5-	2
3	15	2534.5	-691286.0	21524685.0	40.1	167.8	29.1	5	3
4	25	-1866.6	56404.7	21263964.2	39.1	232.3	36.0	5-	4
5	29	1239.2	-2081662.8	19302546.8	44.0	328.8	61.9	5	5
6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6
7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7
SBAS_L1_I_PRIMARY									
1	131	-79.9	83280.1	35848512.2	42.8	214.7	48.9	6-	1
2	135	-79.9	2192.5	36632248.7	43.2	234.5	38.0	6-	2
3	138	-82.1	87685.0	35578702.9	45.0	198.5	53.2	6-	3
4	133	-154.3	192680.2	35507147.0	41.5	180.4	54.3	6-	4
GALILEO_E1_BC_PRIMARY									
1	2	-2336.9	1874.9	26248521.9	31.1	239.4	12.6	6*-	1
2	4u	-2587.6	-0.0	0.0	26.8	40.5	15.1	6-	2
3	5	2131.4	-3254754.1	23062050.7	45.8	182.5	49.0	6	3
4	9	-524.3	141159.6	20481714.7	46.0	75.6	60.7	6	4
5	11	-1487.4	28471.2	23952196.0	30.6	97.6	31.3	6-	5
6	22	1795.4	-9356.3	22728390.7	43.3	313.0	28.9	6	6
7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7
8	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8
Navigation Data									
X:	-742657.04	Y:	-5461987.51	Z:	3198259.26	deltRx:	-1294900.86		
Xvel:	-1.35	Yvel:	-4.50	Zvel:	-8.32	deltRxDot:	20.38		
Hsigma:	0.17	Vsigma:	0.37	NISratio:	1.17				

Keys to Robust CDGNSS Positioning






Multiple Rover
Antennas

Multiple
Frequencies

Dense Reference
Network

Fusion with
Vision/Radar

Keys to Robust CDGNSS Positioning



Multiple Rover
Antennas


Multiple
Frequencies

Dense Reference
Network



Fusion with
Vision/Radar

Completely eliminate ionospheric and tropospheric errors as a factor






Corrections uncertainty is a highly nonlinear function of density. Culprit: medium-scale ionospheric irregularities. **Floor due to multipath at mobile device reached with < 20km inter-station distance.**



Longhorn Dense Reference Network stations under test prior to deployment

Keys to Robust CDGNSS Positioning



Multiple Rover
Antennas

Multiple
Frequencies

Dense Reference
Network

Fusion with
Vision/Radar



Goal: Decimeter-
accurate visual and
radar features



GNSS-INS provides
initial pose and
global reference



Merges globally-
referenced maps
from multiple
sessions




Cooperative fleet
refinement of map



GNSS Antennas
Stereo Cameras
Radar
Inertial Sensor

GEOSLAM: Global Electro-Optical SLAM

Cooperative mapping at decimeter accuracy for all-weather localization




CDGNSS solutions are high-confidence 5-cm accurate, but not continuously available



Lines drawn between independent CDGNSS solutions from each of Sensorium's two antennas

GEOSLAM ⇌ PpEngine





W 38th St

W 38th St


W 38th St

Speedway

Speedway

Speedway

Speedway





Isn't this a self-fulfilling loop?
Aren't the errors correlated?

Not if done carefully...

Map of 3D camera image features is means to an end: it can't be relied on when visibility poor, but when visibility good, it can be used (jointly with GNSS) to obtain highly accurate vehicle pose

with which a radar map can be built

Sensorium radar data: Delphi unit




A radar map is useful in all weather conditions.

Our conjecture: In urban areas rich with radar reflectors, a radar map together with GNSS will be sufficient for 30 cm @ 95% accuracy

+3.03e1

Radar Detection Map




GEOSLAM radar map
using Sensorium's
Delphi radar


Frame: 0



Sensorium radar data: Raw-data unit



New experimental radar allows us to create our own waveforms and access the raw returns (not just processed tracking points) to create more informative radar maps





THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
RADIONAVIGATION LABORATORY

Robust
&
Secure

General Automated Control System Security

Secure Control: Towards Survivable Cyber-Physical Systems*


Alvaro A. Cárdenas Saurabh Amin Shankar Sastry
University of California, Berkeley 2008



The general secure control problem envisions arbitrary manipulation of y (e.g., deception and DoS attacks) and u (e.g., actuator attacks)

The UT Radionavigation Lab's Focus:

Sensor attacks: attacks on sensors by manipulation of the physical fields (e.g., electromagnetic, acoustic, pressure, etc.) they measure – especially against navigation, timing, and collision avoidance system sensors



Useful Concepts and Approaches

Defenders should seek to minimize, and attackers max., *integrity risk*

Analysis must encompass full defender-attacker closed-loop dynamics

Full analysis of complex differential games may be intractable, but useful results may arise from only “one level of gaming.”

Useful Concepts and Approaches


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Full analysis of complex differential games may be intractable, but useful results may arise from only “one level of gaming.”



White Rose of Drachs: 65-meter, \$80M research laboratory in the Mediterranean




Goal is not just to maximize P_D for a fixed P_F , nor to minimize time-to-detect for a fixed P_F and P_D . For vehicle security, goal should be to minimize *integrity risk* for a given false alarm rate

Generalization of notion of integrity risk:


The cost of deciding for hypothesis i depends not only on which hypothesis is true, but more precisely on the parameters of the attack: not all attacks are equally costly.

Use $C[i, \theta]$ to model cost, not C_{ij}

The Power-Distortion GNSS Spoofing Defense



Authentic (blue) and spoofing (red) signals interact in the correlation domain. To eliminate interaction, spoofer must either null or overpower the authentic signals. Nulling difficult: requires accurate knowledge of length of and fading along signal path.



We have determined the optimum decision regions for a combined power and distortion hypothesis test to indicate clean (green), multipath (black), spoofing (red), or jamming (blue). Costs are expressed as fnc. of spoofing power, delay, and phase.

Useful Concepts and Approaches

Defenders should seek to minimize, and attackers max., *integrity risk*

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Full analysis of complex differential games may be intractable, but useful results may arise from only “one level of gaming.”




Figure 4: Block diagram of the closed-loop UAV-spoofing system showing the interconnections between the UAV controller G_c , plant P , and estimator G_e ; and the spoofer controller G_c^s , plant P^s and estimator G_e^s . The spoofer plant P^s embodies the double integrator dynamics that generate x^* from a^* . Thick lines represent vector data paths.

A.J. Kerns, D.P. Shepard, J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, "Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing," Journal of Field Robotics, 2014

Analysis of interplay between defender and attacker must consider full closed-loop system including: (1) vehicle dynamics (including state estimation and control), (2) defender's detection strategy, (3) predictability of defender's control actions, and (4) attacker's state estimation system

Useful Concepts and Approaches

Defenders should seek to minimize, and attackers max., *integrity risk*

Analysis must encompass full defender-attacker closed-loop dynamics

Full analysis of complex differential games may be intractable, but useful results may arise from only “one level of gaming.”



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